"FREE and fair" - or "fad and fashion", as one Khmer academic

dubs it - is the catchcry of elections '98. At times, they seem like magic words

to release a genie from a bottle: repeat them enough and maybe it will materialize.

As many as 50% of Cambodians may have got the message, and say they believe that

free, fair and credible elections are possible, according to one survey. But the

reality is that it's hard to find anyone involved in politics, bar a Prime Minister

or two, who believes this is anything but a pipe dream.

Putting aside human rights and democracy advocates, if you ask virtually any Khmer

politician, civil servant or NGO worker whether the polls will be free and fair,

you are rewarded with a wry, knowing smile. Privately, no one has any illusions.

Publicly, the environment is so free and fair that almost no one will put their names

to anything but the blandest of statements about politics and elections.

In line with the reality, Cambodia's election vocabulary is expanding rapidly, courtesy

of foreign donors. The new words are qualifiers: Free and fair has become "free-ish

and fair-ish"; diplomats speak of "relatively" or "reasonably"

free and fair elections, of "credible" or "acceptable" polls,

and of "unacceptable" - versus "acceptable" - levels of violence

and intimidation.

Relative to what, and reasonable, credible and acceptable to whom, is usually left

unsaid, except for references to "the Southeast Asian context". Like any

good election campaign promise, the wording is loose.

The fundamental reason why the election will not be free and fair, almost everyone

agrees, is that Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won't give up power if it

loses. Unless the CPP believes it is popular enough to win a truly free and fair

ballot, such a vote cannot be allowed. And, in a country where power has long come

from the barrel of a gun, where there has been minimal experience of free elections,

and where the CPP was bitterly shocked at its election loss in 1993, why should the

party take chances this time?

Given that 26,000 foreign peacekeepers failed to prevent the killing or wounding

of 100 Funcinpec activists and hundreds of incidents of intimidation in the 1993

UN-sponsored "free and fair" elections - which the CPP still failed to

win - "there is a high probability that military force will be used to ensure

that we arrive at the appropriate election result" in '98, as one veteran foreign

observer puts it.

From the foreign funders of the elections, to the Khmer politicians planning to take

their chances in them, everyone knows that Cambodian democracy extends only so far

as CPP maintains dominance; the only question about the next government is which

party or parties will play the role of coalition partner to CPP.

Title Match

Why bother with elections, then? For the CPP, there are obvious benefits. To a

party which has never had indisputable legitimacy - born out of the Vietnamese occupation

of the 1980s, and which took an international battering after the events of last

July - the stamp of being a "democratically-elected, internationally-recognized"

government is attractive. Not least of all, it promises to get foreign aid, investment

and tourism back on track, pumping new life into a stagnating economy.

The bottom line, according to one senior CPP official who spoke to the Post, is that

party leaders want elections they know they cannot lose. They are extremely reluctant

to have a re-run of '93, when the CPP refused to recognize the result, and threatened

violence in order to secure a larger slice of a coalition government than its votes

warranted.

In '98, the official says, if the party believes that it is doomed at the ballot

boxes. It will find a pretext - presumably an increase in guerrilla fighting, political

instability, etc - to suspend the polls. Since early last year, the CPP has been

conducting surveys to establish its voter support - the results of which are a tightly-kept

secret but are widely rumored to be less than positive - and such surveying will

continue right up to the ballot.

For opposition politicians, analysts say their electoral chances largely depend on

"free and fair" issues: freedom to campaign in safety; access to television,

radio and newspapers to spread their messages; and, ultimately, their ability to

convince voters that they can afford to vote according to their hearts, and that

their ballots will actually count.

It has the hallmarks of a no-win situation for the opposition: the more they try

to stretch the ropes which tie them, the easier it is for them to be hanged; the

more campaign freedoms they win, the better their chances on ballot day, the more

the CPP will feel threatened, and the greater the prospect of intimidation and violence.

That is a point not lost on the countries funding the elections, which have been

loath to impose concrete conditions on what they consider to be "free and fair",

"credible" and "acceptable".

While on one hand donors may be seeking to minimize violence, on the other they view

the elections as an escape route from the Cambodian minefield: a chance to resolve

Hun Sen's legitimacy crisis, try to ensure some political stability and continue

the "de-internationalization" of Cambodia's problems. And what of democracy?

"The mere act of elections is democracy - forget the result" is one diplomat's

summary of the general view.

Adds another foreign official involved with the elections: "Most people are

seeing this as a realpolitik situation. The world is getting very tired of Cambodia.

They're looking for a way out."

So the scene is set for the chess game that is elections '98: the foreign-financed

board is looking increasingly tilted; the referee - the world, not Cambodians - has

fingers crossed that not too many pawns will be sacrificed; the players can make

up the rules as they go along, but the result, bar any grand surprise moves or the

game being called off, seems a foregone conclusion.

When it's over, and checkmate is declared after the July 26 ballot day, "no

one is going to be enormously proud of having been associated with this," admits

one of the foreign officials, "but the question is, what is the alternative?"

Realpolitik

For now, the CPP is confident that realpolitik - domestic as well as international

- will win it the game. As well as its more than 2 million claimed members, the party

is counting on many more voters casting their ballots according to the realities

of rural Cambodian life.

"There is a Khmer saying that 'The boat comes and goes, but the port remains

the same'," says a CPP civil servant. "[If I am a villager] I know very

well that when Sam Rainsy goes away, when the others go away, I will be left with

the chief of my village, of my commune, the local military police who can come to

surround me - this is the reality.

"When you are in the village, you react in a survivalist way. There's no UNTAC

now; NGOs come and go. This is the reality of my life. I have my land, my ricefields,

and I want to keep them."

Most observers agree that Cambodia's well-entrenched provincial structures, with

commune and village chiefs and local militia almost exclusively CPP members, provide

ample opportunities for coercion of voters.

One of several particularly worrying issues, say opposition politicians and democracy

advocates, is that all the votes are likely to be counted at each of the 17,000 polling

stations - one for about every 500 voters - in the villages and communes where they

were cast.

"It should take village chiefs all of five minutes to work out who voted against

the CPP," notes one observer, as to why villagers may feel less than confident

about the secrecy of their ballots.

For the time being, there isn't much of a choice anyway. There is, as one foreign

NGO chief puts it, "the de facto non-possibility of an opposition in the countryside".

Prince Norodom Ranariddh's Funcinpec party remains in disorder, its military and

political structure shattered, its leader still abroad and facing criminal charges

at home.

Sam Rainsy's Khmer Nation Party (KNP) and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP)

of Son Sann loyalists are still fighting just to use their party names, in competition

with CPP-backed rivals, let alone to be able to get out into the provinces to safely

open offices and campaign.

"In '98, do the people have a choice?" asks a foreign analyst. "If

they can't see the party signs, if they can't hear the political parties' messages

on the radio, if they can't read them in the press, if they can't speak to political

activists because those activists are too frightened, if there are parties who cannot

campaign on the names which are recognized by the people as belonging to them, the

question is, do the people have a part to play in these elections?"

The biggest issue is a return by Ranariddh, who has won himself few friends in the

international community who will insist on his participation in the polls.

Without international pressure - or a daring move by Ranariddh such as a sudden return

to Cambodia to force the issue - his expected trial on weapons and national security

charges could be delayed for months, leaving him in limbo.

If he returns, he can expect, as one diplomat says, to be convicted "of very

serious charges, of conspiring to overthrow the government in conjunction with the

genocidal regime [the Khmer Rouge], and possibly to have to publicly beg his father

for an amnesty - that's not a strong position". The CPP, in its campaigning,

will make the most of Ranariddh's alleged treason.

Despite that, the CPP knows very well from '93 that regardless of Ranariddh's leadership

abilities - and there are many in the foreign community and among Cambodia's elite

who think very little of them - his royal blood gives him an electoral head start.

"In the countryside, people still like Ranariddh. He represents the monarchy

and Sihanouk." says a Khmer NGO representative. "That loyalty is hard to

shake. Hun Sen knows exactly that. The [July] coup was prompted, I believe, largely

by the CPP understanding that Ranariddh is still popular in the countryside and,

if he were here, he might get more votes than the CPP."

A foreign NGO official agrees: "Hun Sen will do his utmost not to let him run,

because in the countryside, he is popular. He is the King's son and now, he is also

seen as the victim."

One of the biggest questions of '98 is where the royalist vote will go, which is

why virtually everyone - from Sam Rainsy to Ranariddh deserters Ung Huot, Loy Sim

Chheang and Toan Chay - claims to support the King. (Ung Huot's and Loy Sim Chheang's

respective new parties, Sangkum Thmei and Reastr Niyum, aim to benefit from the symbolism

of Sihanouk's Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime of the 1950-60s.)

To the CPP, the King's popularity is the biggest danger. It is one reason why, to

them, free and fair elections, Western-style, are inherently unfree and unfair, Cambodian-style.

"What does Ranariddh really stand for?" asks the CPP official, who spoke

to the Post on condition of anonymity. "What does Toan Chay really stand for?

Ung Huot? Nady Tan? The King, that's what they say. Everyone can use the name of

the King, except the CPP.

"That's why CPP considers the elections are not fair - you control the power,

you control the country, and the ballot papers can take that away from you? No."

The Grandmasters

The CPP knows that the only one who can really rival the party is that old grandmaster

of Cambodian politics, King Sihanouk. Even if they can keep Ranariddh out of the

game, what they fear the most are any bold moves by his father.

The CPP believes, and has for years, that the King seeks to resume executive power,

or at least force Cambodia's politicians to the Royal negotiating table at which

he can engineer a government more to his liking. The elections may offer him his

last chance.

The CPP official says that many in the party believe that the King, knowing that

Hun Sen is set to cement his power and legitimacy for another five-year term, wants

to stop the elections.

"The King will try to provoke some crisis as he is always trying to do,"

the official alleges. "In the event that he cannot prevent the electoral process...he

will have to endorse someone. Even to endorse someone indirectly, if the King will

do that... I think it would bring people to the voting stations [to vote against

CPP]. That is very dangerous."

A foreign observer comments: "The King could finally make a judgment and say,

'My dear children, you know what you have been through. You know the CPP and Hun

Sen has not let me play any role. Now you must support me to help change Cambodia.'

That would be extremely damaging to the CPP, particularly if Voice of America were

to broadcast it, so it was heard up and down the country."

However, although most observers agree that the King sincerely believes he is the

only one to lead his nation out of peril, many doubt that he is prepared to directly

challenge Hun Sen. His main aim is to ensure the monarchy's future; the question

is whether appeasement or confrontation is the better move.

So far, many believe he has chosen the former. Although he has constantly sniped

at the government, expressed dismay at CPP-supported republicanism, and even publicly

contemplated suicide, King Sihanouk has always exercised restraint: he declined to

judge whether last July was a coup d'état, did not oppose the new government,

and has avoided granting amnesties to political figures - including Ranariddh - without

Hun Sen's prior approval.

"He says he doesn't want to be remembered as the last King who destroyed the

monarchy," notes a Khmer observer who has been granted Royal audiences. "I

feel he is too Kingly, trying to please the powerful men, to send a message of 'I

am kind to you, you should be kind to me'."

A key factor, many observers speculate, is the role of Queen Monique. She is reported

to be counseling the King not to antagonize Hun Sen, and attempting to screen the

information and visitors he receives.

Her concern - and indeed the King's - is the post-Sihanouk future. It is widely believed,

though denied by the King, that she seeks to be appointed Regent Queen, or have her

son Prince Sihamoni enthroned, after Sihanouk dies or abdicates. "I'm afraid

that the Queen has some secret deal with Hun Sen," remarks a Khmer royal watcher.

Even if the King were prepared to act boldly, whom could he use and rely upon? "He

has little room to maneuver," says another Khmer observer. "He has brains,

but he doesn't have limbs. It's not like the old days, when he had people to turn

his views into actions."

As for endorsing someone, the King's disdain for his son Ranariddh is well known.

The CPP official alleges the King doesn't even want to amnesty Ranariddh, but is

content to let Hun Sen be "the bad guy" by appearing the only obstacle

to an amnesty.

Then there is Sam Rainsy, who frequently invokes the name of the King. Most recently,

Rainsy appealed for a public demonstration to support the King's return to Cambodia

from Beijing - attracting a sharp rebuke from Sihanouk that his name should be kept

out of politics, and threatening to cut-off his "close relationship" with

Rainsy.

The KNP leader, meanwhile, was not perturbed. "I am just a scapegoat for the

King's anger at others. When you are in a family, you can afford to express your

feelings..." he says of the King's chastisement.

Does Rainsy expect the King to endorse him, or anyone else? "Even if I suspected

the King of anything like this, I cannot say. It would destroy my relationship with

the King," replies Rainsy.

Analysts agree that Rainsy is hoping for, but not necessarily counting on, some royal

help. Not all think that it will be forthcoming. "The King has serious doubts

about Rainsy; he thinks he is a republican and not a real democrat," says a

foreigner and occasional Royal visitor.

The CPP, meanwhile, keeps up the pressure: fueling republican sentiment through its

media outlets and political allies, and implicitly threatening to abolish the monarchy.

The threat may be hollow - to do so would risk a considerable public backlash - but

the message is still there: we will take revenge on the monarchy, sooner or later,

if you go too far.

While the King and Hun Sen can be expected to continue their sparring, particularly

when it comes to royal recognition of the election result and new government, it

is far from certain that either wants all-out war. Not least of all, some observers

suggest, because neither one - perhaps with a degree of admiration for each other

as a worthy opponent - may be sure of decisive victory.

The gambit

Between the King, Ranariddh and the CPP, the most dangerous path is being charted

by Sam Rainsy. Cambodia's most outspoken dissident has reason to hate both Ranariddh

and Hun Sen - having been thrown out of Funcinpec by the former and had (by his own

allegation) grenades thrown at him by the latter - but he also knows that, by himself,

all the votes in the world won't win him power.

So far, his strategy is to flirt with both his enemies: he remains a member of the

Ranariddh-backed Union of Cambodian Democrats (UCD), while entertaining the prospect

of a coalition with the CPP.

As for Ranariddh's return, Rainsy is of two minds. "I would benefit from an

absent Ranariddh, definitely," he says, confident of attracting many votes which

would otherwise go to the King's son.

On the other hand, he is aware of his party faithful's isolated position, easy targets

for intimidation and violence in the provinces, if he is virtually the sole opposition.

"The CPP fears... that if Ranariddh returns, he will be able to rebuild Funcinpec.

The vast majority of the grassroots supporters of Funcinpec are still loyal to Ranariddh.

They hate Hun Sen," Rainsy says.

"A rebuilding of Funcinpec by Ranariddh would contribute to a balancing of the

power, to prevent Hun Sen from doing anything he wants to do," he maintains,

despite CPP's overwhelming victory the last time its power was put to the test against

Funcinpec's.

For now, Rainsy says he is firmly with the UCD, which supports Ranariddh "not

as an individual but as a matter or principle" and threatens to boycott the

ballot if the Prince cannot run.

At the same time, Rainsy - after an unprecedented meeting with his former arch-enemy

Hun Sen on Dec 8 - says he is willing to "forge an alliance with the devil".

The way Rainsy tells it, Hun Sen and his advisers "asked me to have working

sessions... to define a common political platform, or at least common political goals,

which we would work together on in the context of a coalition government."

He says that if his conditions - a ceasefire and "free and fair" elections

- "start to be met", he will talk with the CPP and invite other parties

to join them.

Rainsy says he is under no illusions: the CPP is courting him as the lesser of two

evils (with the intention to keep Ranariddh out), they have no intention of giving

up much power, and what they say and do are different matters.

"[The CPP] cannot afford to fight two enemies at the same time. That's why they

try to appease me. I fully understand that. But I want to take this opportunity to

bring about some benefits to Cambodia."

Noting that the CPP sees 1998 as "the historical and unique chance to legitimize

their power", he says: "I think I am the only one who can offer the CPP

the chance to remain in power, in a Cambodia at peace, in a more democratic Cambodia.

They have to consider the possibility of being eliminated. They are against the trend

of the world... toward democracy, human rights, the will of the people."

And Hun Sen, the man he has repeatedly accused of being a dictator and murderer?

"I think I am the only one who can offer Hun Sen a way out, to rehabilitate

himself morally and politically. The Khmer Rouge will kill him if they return to

power, Ranariddh will eliminate him if he returns to power... I told Hun Sen that

I am not inspired by revenge.

"...My other option is to align myself with Ranariddh and fight strongly, as

we did before July. I imagine we would have to fight [Hun Sen] to the finish... This

would make a protracted war in Cambodia."

Feints and bluffs

To some, Rainsy is playing a smart game of realpolitik, knowing that a precarious

foot in the door of a government is better than a strategy of confrontation which

may get him nothing but death. To others, he is naive at best and a sell-out at worst.

"Hun Sen neutralizes him," says one foreign analyst of Rainsy. "Who

looked the better peacemaker when they stood together on the steps [of Hun Sen's

Takhmao house]... Hun Sen can say 'Here is my most virulent, outspoken critic coming

to meet me and I am openly welcoming him'."

In reference to the suspected political killing of a KNP worker, the analyst asks

"how many more Prey Veng activists have to be killed" before Rainsy realizes

Hun Sen will not play fairly and, even if KNP could get into a coalition government,

"for how long?".

Rainsy, for his part, acknowledges: "Yes, I think it is the will of the CPP

not to give up power. But the CPP, like any communist party, has a long term view...they

are prepared to share power while not giving up real power."

In the same breath, Rainsy insists he is not prepared to legitimize "a mockery

of elections". He knows that Hun Sen isn't keeping his word. "Hun Sen has

told me many nice things and made many nice promises, but behind my back, he has

been doing the contrary."

Former KNP security chief Srun Vong Vannak has yet to be freed from jail, despite

Hun Sen's promise to seek his release more than a month ago. Rainsy alleges Hun Sen

is also encouraging Kong Mony, who leads a shadow KNP, to open provincial offices.

As for himself, Rainsy acknowledges he is effectively unable to open rural offices

or to have television and radio coverage, and that, in Prey Veng at least, his activists

are being killed.

Are either CPP or KNP really prepared to have a coalition, or are they merely toying

with each other, hands clasped behind their backs with hidden knives?

Most observers agree that the pair are testing the waters, each attempting to lure

some benefit - Rainsy hoping to get at least a little leeway to boost his provincial

structure, perhaps, and Hun Sen benefiting from the appearance of an opposition -

but no one doubts that their strategies could change at any time.

A senior Khmer NGO representatives suggests the short-term CPP trade-off is that,

to keep Ranariddh out, Rainsy needs to be accepted in order to satisfy the international

community: "An election without any opposition is clearly not free and fair.

Hun Sen sees that Rainsy has no party structure. He wants him to win some votes,

but not a lot...10-15 seats is allowable."

The CPP official acknowledges that his party's preference is to form a coalition

with other parties, such as "non-Ranariddh" Funcinpec ones like Ung Huot's,

but that - depending on the election results and the international response - the

inclusion of Rainsy is possible.

"[If Rainsy wins] under 10 seats, no way. More than 10 seats, and there's a

way for him to negotiate," says the official.

But, he implies, Rainsy had better not win too many seats. "Both [Hun Sen and

Rainsy] know that at some crossroads, you will have to take out the sword... If Rainsy

wins with other arguments, the last argument will be with the sword."

The leader of a small, CPP-aligned party, when asked about Rainsy's election prospects,

puts it succinctly: "Sam Rainsy can die any day, any place."

The odds

No one doubts that another coalition government is inevitable, because of the Constitution

(which requires two-thirds parliamentary approval of a new government) and the need

for the appearance of multi-party democracy (a 99.9% CPP election result being somewhat

hard to explain as "free and fair").

Officially, the CPP target is to win 73 of 122 seats, a little under the two-thirds

margin. As for Rainsy, he sees the best hope as CPP, KNP and a Ranariddh-led Funcinpec

each getting 30% of the vote, the remaining 10% split among smaller parties.

In that scenario, what would he do? Rainsy lists the options: for Funcinpec-KNP to

attempt to form a government without the CPP (confrontational, dangerous and hard

to achieve, he acknowledges); a KNP-CPP coalition, excluding Funcinpec; or a three-way

coalition.

Rainsy prefers the last option, with KNP in the middle as the "glue" between

Hun Sen and Ranariddh. Would Hun Sen accept Ranariddh back? "I told Hun Sen

that if there's one person who has any reason to hate Hun Sen and refuse to accept

Hun Sen in a coalition government, it would be me - if I can accept Hun Sen, why

can't he accept Ranariddh?" asks Rainsy.

While he says he stands by Ranariddh, Rainsy is still considering the prospect of

ditching him from any coalition. "I'm not entirely ruling that out because I

have doubts about the capability of Funcinpec to be a ruling party."

But he adds that, despite Ranariddh's past campaign "to get rid of the best

people in Funcinpec", there are still good people in the party. His preference,

he says, is to work with the "good elements" of both Funcinpec and CPP

in a coalition.

As for his chances of the CPP accepting him into a coalition, Rainsy agrees that

he will not be Hun Sen's first choice. "If the international community is satisfied

with a cosmetic coalition government, they will make do with that. If the government

cannot gain the respect and recognition of the world, then they will move closer

to KNP."

And should he succeed? Rainsy claims - contrary to his nature, many observers believe

- that he wouldn't rock the boat in a CPP-KNP coalition.

"There would be no surprises, that I would have too much power and that they

would have too little power," says a man who made his reputation on an uncompromising

hard line against Hun Sen. "I want to go very fast on implementing reforms that

are needed urgently in Cambodia, but I know that the CPP is not keen on reforms,

because they have too many entrenched interests. So we have to strike a deal, and

move at an appropriate pace. I have said that to them; they have nothing to fear."

Ultimately, as Ranariddh reportedly remarked to Rainsy at a recent UCD meeting in

Bangkok: "Everyone is watching you now to see whether you will be more clever

than Mr Hun Sen, or whether Mr Hun Sen is more clever than you."

Checkmate

Behind the kings, queens, knights and rooks, the pawns are lining up, from Ung Huot

and Loy Sim Chheang's new parties, to Ieng Mouly's BLDP, to dozens of tiny parties

being formed. Get a party, align yourself with CPP, and hope to secure a few parliamentary

seats, the odd ministerial post or - if you just happen to fit into the grander moves

as they unfold - a bigger slice of a coalition government.

One player to watch, some observers suggest, is the Khmer Citizen Party of former

Funcinpec deputy secretary-general, and short-time KNP convert, Nguon Soeur. He appears

increasingly close to the CPP - most recently he wrote an open letter to the King

warning "I don't want to see you lose the throne again" - and is winning

coverage in pro-government newspapers.

Whether it is Soeur or a non-Ranariddh "royalist" such as Ung Huot who

can capture enough votes to win the role of No.2 in the next government, they and

other budding contestants are playing a vital role for Hun Sen.

With more than 40 parties in existence now, many but not all of them aligned to CPP,

the strongman of Cambodian politics can point out the flourishing state of multi-party

democracy. He can also look forward to the non-CPP vote being divided among them.

"For Hun Sen, the more parties, the better - it splits the vote" - providing

that none of them are strong enough alone to win a large proportion, notes a foreign

watcher.

And after the election, what better way to show that Cambodia still has democracy

than to have a large coalition, with plenty of smaller parties complementing the

mighty CPP (except, as Sam Rainsy is quick to point out, by having the country's

most outspoken dissident in the government)?

Similarly, the CPP is courting many local NGOs. As one NGO chief points out, if the

election results are contested by Ranariddh, Rainsy or others, Hun Sen will parade

dozens of small parties and NGOs to declare their satisfaction with the freedom and

fairness of the elections. Alternatively, they will declare the opposite if, by some

chance, it should be Hun Sen contesting the result.

Another scenario is that, if there is no one able to capture the hearts of the royalist

voters and there is little cohesive campaigning by the opposition, the non-CPP vote

will simply stay at home.

"A low election turnout is a danger," says a Khmer NGO representative.

"The party faithful would get all their followers and beneficiaries to vote,

but few other people would vote. A low turnout would mean their disapproval of the

system altogether, to say the least, not to mention their fears."

Another Khmer NGO official points out that if the international community is prepared

to accept Ranariddh's absence, as well as a potentially low voter turn-out, the opposition's

last option - a boycott of the elections - will achieve nothing.

All Hun Sen - and, more precisely, the CPP's provincial security forces - has to

do, says a foreign official, is remember that the checkmate is virtually declared

already.

"I just hope Hun Sen sees it that way... If he plays it right, he can have a

sufficiently free and fair election with, if not an absence of bully boy tactics,

then at a low-enough level to be acceptable."

And what of the F words, "free and fair"?

What do they mean anyway? One observer's definition: "The starting point that

I think you will have to ask after the elections is 'Did the electorate, having gone

through an election, feel that in any way the resulting government reflected the

will of the people?'"

Then again, that was never really the aim of the game.