At this time it seems to me that the present Cambodian constitutional system apparently tends to be collaged because it cannot control the practical problems in its political machinery. The caretaker government has apparently existed a power without rights because it lost de jure status.

The National Assembly likely has authority without power because it cannot open its session. The application of power without rights is unconstitutionality.

This has led to the government for private interests or groups instead of government for the whole people. This is not the artificial crisis but is a real political crisis that has legally encouraged by constitutional doctrine of pro-consensus politics (the 2/3 and 7/10 majority system).

In practice, doctrine of pro-consensus politics could be possible only within democratic culture, but it is hard and impossible within Cambodian traditional way of authoritarianism. Cambodia's past constitutional history seems to show that the incompetence of constitutional governments led to their replacement by despots. Feebleness is no guarantee of constitutionalism, and it has usually been the chief cause of its overthrow.

- Sarin Yuthavong, - Phnom Penh